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Abstract
Anonymous database search protocols allow users to query a database
anonymously. This can be achieved by letting the users form a peer-
to-peer community and post queries on behalf of each other. In this
article we discuss an application of combinatorial configurations (also
known as regular and uniform partial linear spaces) to a protocol for
anonymous database search, as defining the key-distribution within the
user community that implements the protocol. The degree of anonymity
that can be provided by the protocol is determined by properties of the
neighborhoods and the closed neighborhoods of the points in the com-
binatorial configuration that is used. Combinatorial configurations with
unique neighborhoods or unique closed neighborhoods are described and
we show how to attack the protocol if such configurations are used. We ap-
ply k-anonymity arguments and present the combinatorial configurations
with k-anonymous neighborhoods and with k-anonymous closed neigh-
borhoods. The transversal designs and the linear spaces are presented
as optimal configurations among the configurations with k-anonymous
neighborhoods and k-anonymous closed neighborhoods, respectively.
1 Introduction
Anonymous database search is the discipline dedicated to the study of the ano-
nymity of query searches in databases. Namely, it is dedicated to the study of
protocols that allow a user to retrieve information from a database server with-
out revealing for the server who he is. Anonymous database search has also been
called user-private information retrieval (UPIR) [7, 8, 18]. Another example of
anonymous database search, similar to the previously mentioned UPIR proto-
cols, is the protocol Crowds [12]. Unlike private information retrieval (PIR)
protocols, UPIR protocols do not hide the query for the database.
Usually, when people access to a database server, the responsibility of guar-
anteeing their privacy is assigned to the database owner or to a trusted third
party. In UPIR protocols, the privacy of the user is put in the hand of the user.
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The protocols for UPIR presented in [7, 8, 18, 20] are defined on a P2P
community, and are called P2P UPIR. In a P2P UPIR protocol, a community
of P2P users agree to collaborate in order to search the database anonymously.
The users send queries to the database on behalf of other users, without revealing
to the database the identity of the owner of the query. In this way, the query
profiles of the users are diffused among the rest of the users in the community.
Moreover, the protocol distributes the queries uniformly to avoid tracing of the
queries.
The queries are written and read by users on some memory sectors that
are called communication spaces. Each user has access only to some of these
communication spaces. As a mean to hinder unauthorized entities from obtain-
ing information about queries, the information on the communication spaces is
encrypted.
If the encryption of the information on the communication spaces uses the
same key over the entire network, then there is a high risk that the key is
compromised. But if the number of keys is too large, then the users can have
storage problems. Given a set of requirements on the protocol, the search for
the optimal distribution of communication spaces and keys can be defined as a
combinatorial problem with constraints.
In the articles [7, 8, 18, 17], combinatorial configurations, also known as reg-
ular and uniform partial linear spaces, were used to manage the distribution of
communications spaces and keys for P2P UPIR. These combinatorial structures
have been used for distributing keys also in other contexts, as in [14]. In [20]
the P2P UPIR protocols were modified and extended to more general families
of block designs.
Curious users should be prevented from obtaining information about other
users. It can be proved that this prevention is simplified if we avoid, for instance,
designs in which a pair of users share more than one communication space, and
designs in which a user can access all communication spaces. This motivates
the use of combinatorial configurations.
In this article, we apply k-anonymity arguments to the construction of anon-
ymous database search algorithms, and present the combinatorial congurations
with k-anonymous (open) neighborhoods and with k-anonymous closed neigh-
borhoods. We study transversal designs and linear spaces and we show that
they are optimal configurations. We present two versions of P2P UPIR proto-
cols that are based on the protocols presented in [7, 8, 17, 20]. In one of the
protocols (P2P UPIR 1), the user cannot forward directly his own queries to
the database, while in the other he is allowed to do so (P2P UPIR 2).
The P2P UPIR 2 protocol is a modification of P2P UPIR 1, designed in order
to avoid so-called neighborhood attacks in some combinatorial configurations.
These attacks were first described in [17], and are based on query repetition
from the P2P UPIR users, in combination with unique neighborhoods in the
combinatorial configuration. As observed in [20], a neighborhood attack can be
modeled as the intersection of neighborhoods, that may return a single identified
point in the case of a unique neighborhood. In this article we give several
examples of combinatorial configurations with unique neighborhoods.
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The results presented in this article, shows that it is not necessary for users
to self-submit their queries in order to avoid neighborhood attacks. We present
a family of combinatorial configurations with anonymous neighborhoods. We
use the concept of k-anonymity to measure the degree of this anonymity, and
say that a point has a k-anonymous neighborhood if it is the neighborhood of
at least k − 1 other points. Then we study and characterize the combinatorial
configurations with k-anonymous neighborhoods. In particular, we justify why
the transversal designs can be regarded as optimal among the configurations
with k-anonymous neighborhoods for P2P UPIR 1. We also characterize the
anonymity that is provided by the P2P UPIR 1 protocol, when combinatorial
configurations with k-anonymous neighborhoods are used.
As can be deduced from [18], the linear spaces are optimal configurations
with respect to maximal diffusion of the query profiles. In [20], the linear spaces
were presented as the only combinatorial configurations that can provide P2P
UPIR with so-called perfect anonymity, and this was extended to designs in
general, among which the covering designs were distinguished for having the
same property.
In this article we show that the linear spaces have k-anonymous closed neigh-
borhoods, and that they maximize the parameter k. This justifies once again
why the linear spaces are optimal for P2P UPIR. We also construct a new class of
combinatorial configurations that also have k-anonymous closed neighborhoods,
but in which k is smaller compared to the linear spaces.
This article is structured as follows. Section 2 contains the preliminaries, in
Section 3 we define the P2P UPIR protocols, Section 4 introduces notation and
formalizes P2P UPIR in terms of data privacy. In Section 5 we describe attacks
on P2P UPIR and identify ways to avoid some of them. Section 6 discusses the
nature of the privacy that can be provided by the P2P UPIR protocols and under
what conditions. In Section 7 we give examples of combinatorial configurations
with unique neighborhoods. Sections 8 and 9 classify and give examples of com-
binatorial configurations with k-anonymous neighborhoods and k-anonymous
closed neighborhoods, respectively. The article ends with conclusions.
2 Preliminaries
This section contains known results and concepts that will be used in the rest
of the article.
2.1 Privacy
Most of the definitions and the notation presented in the next paragraph are
taken from [15].
An adversary, or an attacker, is an entity that aims for the destruction of the
privacy protection. A subject s is anonymous if the adversary cannot identify
him within a set of subjects. We call this set of subjects the anonymity set of
s. Two or more so-called items of interest are unlinkable if within the system
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(comprising these and possibly other items), the adversary cannot sufficiently
distinguish whether these items of interest are related or not. In this article, an
item of interest can be a query, a sequence of queries, the owner of a query, the
owner of a sequence of queries, or the identity of this owner. We can express
anonymity in terms of unlinkability; anonymity is provided if it is not possible
to link a subject to the identity of this subject. Confidentiality is the quality of
being prevented from the disclosure of information to unauthorized individuals
or systems.
Disclosure risk control for statistical databases is a research area concerned
with the protection of the privacy of individuals in published statistical data-
bases [11, 24]. The naive solution is to protect the database by simply removing
the identifiers (e.g. name, ID, social security number) from the tables. It is
well-known that this solution is far from satisfactory. In many cases it is rather
easy to recover the identifier of the anonymized record (see for example [21]).
Other more sophisticated solutions for protecting databases have been proposed.
Many of these solutions are methods for obtaining so-called k-anonymity, which
we will define below.
A database is a collection of records of data. We may assume that all records
correspond to distinct individuals or objects. Every record has a unique iden-
tifier and is divided into attributes. The attributes can be very specific, as the
attributes “height” or “gender”, or more general, as the attributes “text” or
“sequence of binary numbers”.
Suppose that the database can be represented as a single table. Let the
records be the rows of the table and let the attributes be the columns. The
intersection of a row and an attribute is a cell in the table, and we call the
data in the cells the entries of the database. Also other data structures, like for
example graphs, or in general, incidence structures, are representable in table
form.
Let T be a table with the set of attributes A. Let B ⊆ A be a subset of these
attributes. We denote the projection of the table on the attributes B by T [B].
We suppose that every record contains information about a unique individual.
An identifier I in a database is an attribute such that it uniquely identifies the
individuals behind the records. In particular, any entry in T [I] is unique. A
quasi-identifier QI in the database is a collection of attributes {A1, . . . , An},
such that they in combination can uniquely, or almost uniquely, identify a record
[4]. That is, the structure of the table allows for the possibility that an entry
in T [QI] is unique, or that there are only a small number of equal entries. In
the former case the entry in T [QI] uniquely identifies the individual behind the
record and in the latter, the few other individuals with the same entries in T [QI]
may form a collusion and use secret information about themselves in order to
make this identification possible.
Example 1. If a table contains information on students in a school class, the
attributes birth data and gender could be sufficient to determine to which in-
dividual a record of the table corresponds, although it is possible that not all
records will be uniquely identified in this way. Hence for this table, birth date
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and gender are an example of a quasi-identifier.
The following definition of k-anonymity appeared for the first time in [13]
(see also [21]).
Definition 2. A table T , that represents a database and has associated quasi-
identifier QI, is k-anonymous if every sequence in T [QI] appears with at least
k occurrences in T [QI].
2.2 Incidence Structures
An incidence structure (P,L, I) sometimes also called a block design, consists
of a point set P , a family of subsets of points L called block set, and an inci-
dence relation I on P . The elements of P and L are called points and blocks,
respectively, and two points are related by the incidence relation if and only if
there is a block containing both. In this article we assume that the same block
only can appear once in L. We will also assume that the incidence structures
are connected, so that for every two different points p, q ∈ P , there is a chain of
incidences starting with p and ending with q.
If all blocks have the same number of points k, then we say that the incidence
structure is k-uniform. If all points are in the same number of blocks r, then
we say that the incidence structure is r-regular. The order of a uniform and
regular incidence structure is the integer pair (k − 1, r − 1).
A parallel class L′ is a subset of L such that for all p ∈ P there is a unique
block l ∈ L′ such that p ∈ l. Every parallel class L′ = {l1, . . . , lm} is a partition
of P , because P = ∪mi=1li and li ∩ lj = ∅ for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m. An incidence
structure (P,L, I) is resolvable if there exists a partition of the set of blocks
L = {L1, . . . , Ls}, such that Li is a parallel class of blocks for 1 ≤ i ≤ s.
The line spanned by two points is the intersection of the all blocks containing
these points. When every pair of points is contained in at most one block, then
the blocks are the lines.
In an incidence structure in which the blocks are lines, we say that two points
are collinear if there is a line through the two points. Observe that a point is
always collinear with itself. We define the closed neighborhood CN(p) of p as
the set of points that are collinear with the point p. The neighborhood or set of
neighbors N(p) of a point p is the set of points in C that are collinear with p
but different from p. Observe that CN(p) = N(p) ∪ {p}.
2.2.1 Linear Spaces, Partial Linear Spaces, and Combinatorial Con-
figurations
A linear space is an incidence structure in which every two points are in exactly
one block, so in a linear space we may say that the blocks are lines. It is not
required for the lines to have the same number of points, but the minimum
number of points on a line is two.
A finite affine plane is an incidence structure in which
• every two points span exactly one line,
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• for every point p and line l not incident with p, there is exactly one other
line m ∈ L such that p is incident with m and l ∩m = ∅,
• there is a triangle, a set of three points such that they pairwise span
different lines.
A finite affine plane is therefore a linear space. In a finite affine plane there is
always a natural number n such that there are n points on every line, n+1 lines
through every point, n2 points and n2 + n lines. In particular, a finite affine
plane is uniform and regular. The order of a finite affine plane is (n− 1, n), but
the usual notation is that the order is n. The second condition in the definition
of affine plane implies that the set of lines is partitioned into classes of parallel
lines, so that an affine plane is resolvable.
The affine plane over a finite field of order q is always a finite affine plane of
order q which we denote by A(Fq). From this it is deduced that there exists a
finite affine plane of order q for every prime power q. When q is not prime, then
there are other finite affine planes than A(Fq), but it is not known if there are
finite affine planes of order n when n is not a power of a prime. It is conjectured
that there exists a finite affine plane of order n if and only if n is a power of a
prime.
Other examples of uniform and regular finite linear spaces are the finite
projective planes, the unitals, and the Denniston designs.
A partial linear space is an incidence structure in which every two points
can be on at most one line. Also it is required that the minimum number of
points on a line is two. All linear spaces are partial linear spaces. The number
of points is usually denoted by v, and the number of lines by b. In this article
we will concentrate on r-regular and k-uniform partial linear spaces, also known
as combinatorial (v, b, r, k)-configurations, or shorter, (r, k)-configurations. For
general references on combinatorial configurations, see [9, 10].
2.2.2 t-Designs and Transversal Designs
Another interesting type of incidence structure are the t-designs. A t-design
with parameters (v, k, λ) has v points, k points in every block and every t-
element subset of points appear in exactly λ blocks. A 2-design with λ =
1 is a combinatorial configuration, or more precisely, a regular linear space.
The 2-designs are also called balanced incomplete block designs with parameters
(v, k, λ), or shorter, (v, k, λ)-BIBD.
In this article we will also treat a third type of incidence structure, the
transversal designs.
A transversal design TDλ(k, n) is a k-uniform incidence structure (P,L, I)
with |P | = kn that admits a partition of P whose parts, called groups, have
cardinality n, and satisfy the following properties:
1. any group and any block contain exactly one common point, and
2. every pair of points from distinct groups is contained in exactly λ blocks.
6
In a transversal design the set of groups forms a partition of P but it is not a
parallel class since the groups are not blocks. On the other hand, if the block set
L can be partitioned into parallel classes, then we get a resolvable transversal
design.
A transversal design TDλ(k, n) is a combinatorial (kn, n
2, n, k)-configuration
if and only if λ = 1. In this article we are interested in the transversal designs
of this kind. For simplicity of notation we will denote a transversal design with
λ = 1 by TD(k, n). It is well-known that affine planes can be used to construct
transversal designs as described in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Whenever there exists a finite affine plane of order n, then for every
2 ≤ k ≤ n there exists a transversal design T (k, n).
Proof. As point set P of TD(k, n), take the points on the k lines from one of
the parallel classes of an affine plane of order n. As the groups of TD(k, n),
take the lines from the same parallel class. As lines of TD(k, n), take the lines
in the rest of the parallel classes of the affine plane, restricted to the points in
P .
More generally, it is well-known that the existence of transversal designs is
related to the existence of a set of mutually orthogonal latin squares. For more
information about these structures, see for example [1, 3].
3 P2P UPIR: peer-to-peer protocols for anony-
mous database search
In this section we describe the peer-to-peer protocols for user-private informa-
tion retrieval (P2P UPIR), first presented in [7, 8]. These protocols use commu-
nication spaces, that are memory sectors in which a user who has access to the
corresponding cryptographic key can write and read queries and the answers
to these queries. The distribution of the cryptographic keys is determined by
a combinatorial configuration. The clients of the protocol are mapped to the
points of a combinatorial configuration, and the keys, or the communication
spaces, are mapped to the lines. The result is that a client, represented by the
point p, has the cryptographic keys giving access to the communication spaces
that are represented by the lines through p.
3.1 The P2P UPIR INIT protocol
The P2P UPIR protocols described herein are called by a protocol that is im-
plemented by all the community of users together. We call this protocol P2P
UPIR INIT. This protocol takes as parameter the combinatorial configuration
for the distribution of communication spaces.
By abuse of notation, we will not distinguish the points and the lines of the
configuration from the users and the communication spaces they represent. A
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communication space is a queue of messages, together with a cryptographic key
from a symmetric cipher, used to encrypt the messages.
The precondition is here that a community P of n users wants to implement
a P2P UPIR protocol. The postcondition is that some user has dropped out of
the protocol.
Protocol 1 (P2P UPIR INIT).
1. The users in P are mapped to the points of the combinatorial configuration.
2. The users repeat execution of the P2P UPIR protocol with frequency f
(which is not required to be constant, nor the same for all users).
Remark 1. The protocol described in [7, 8] was different. For instance, the user
repeated the P2P UPIR protocol only when they had a query to post. However,
in order to limit the waiting time before a user can post his query, and the
response time for the answer, the period of protocol repetition must be bounded.
More exactly, f should always be higher or equal to the highest query submission
frequency among the users.
Remark 2. It is not necessary to end the P2P UPIR INIT protocol only be-
cause a user p is temporally away. The owner of a query that should have been
posted by p, can execute P2P UPIR again in order to get his query posted to the
server. However, we think that only modest and controlled absences should be
allowed for, since a prolonged absence causes the deterioration of the provided
anonymity.
3.2 The P2P UPIR 1 protocol
First we present a P2P UPIR protocol which is similar to the protocol described
in [7, 8], but modified following the ideas from [20]. We will call this protocol
P2P UPIR 1. The individual p is member of a community of user implementing
the P2P UPIR INIT protocol, and p’s execution of P2P UPIR 1 is done within
P2P UPIR INIT. The user p may, or may not, have a query Q which he wants
to post to the community.
Protocol 2 (P2P UPIR 1).
1. The user (point) p selects uniformly at random a communication space
(line) l passing through p;
2. p decrypts the content on l using the corresponding cryptographic key. The
outcome is a queue of messages M = (Mi). For every message Mi in the
queue:
• If Mi is a query addressed to p, then p removes Mi from the
queue, forwards Mi to the server, receives the answer A, encrypts A
and writes A to the end of the queue M ;
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• Else if Mi is an answer to a query belonging to p, then p reads
Mi and removes Mi from the queue M ;
• Else, p leaves Mi on the queue without action;
3. If p has a query Q, then
(a) p selects uniformly at random a point p′ 6= p on l;
(b) p addresses Q to p′ and writes Q to the end of the queue M .
3.3 The P2P UPIR 2 protocol
We also present a variation of the former protocol which we will call P2P UPIR
2. This protocol was first described in [17].
The P2P UPIR 2 protocol differs from the P2P UPIR 1 protocol only in how
the users forward their own queries. We say that a user who forwards his own
queries with probability x, has self-submission x. The P2P UPIR 2 protocol
with self-submission x is obtained from the P2P UPIR 1 protocol by replacing
step 3 (a) by:
3 (a’) p selects a point p′ on l; with probability x he selects p′ = p, else he selects
uniformly at random p′ 6= p on l;
Remark 3. As will be proved in Proposition 5, the P2P UPIR 2 protocol should
be executed with self-submission x = 1|CN(p)| =
1
r(k−1)+1 .
4 Notations and formal framework for the anal-
ysis of P2P UPIR
In this section we will define the formal framework in which the rest of the
analysis will take place.
4.1 Queries
Let P be a community of users implementing an instance of the P2P UPIR
protocol. For every user p ∈ P we define the real query profile RP (p) as the
temporal sequence of queries which p posts to the communication spaces and
the apparent query profile AP (p) as the temporal sequence of queries which the
user posts to the server. By extension we define the real query profile RP (U)
and the apparent query profile AP (U) of a set of users U ⊆ P .
A query is a set of one or more search terms. A repeated query is a query
which occurs more than once in the real profile of a user. A repeated variation of
a query is a query posted by a user which is a slight modification of a previous
query posted by the same user. The latter definition is vague and ambiguous,
but still useful.
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We say that a profile is rare if it contains many unique queries or unique
combinations of queries and we say that it has repetition if it contains many
repeated queries or repeated variations of queries.
4.2 Disclosure control
In [6], three types of privacy protection are distinguished, in function of the
entity for whom the protection is provided: respondent privacy, owner (holder)
privacy and user privacy. The aim of the P2P UPIR protocol is to provide
anonymous database search, which falls under the area of anonymous commu-
nication, or, following the notation in [6], user privacy. However, in this article
we choose to model it in the context of respondent privacy, as a method for
disclosure control of databases. The database protected by P2P UPIR is then
the collection of queries that the users of the protocol post to the server, or in
other words, the real profiles of the users.
There are two important differences between traditional disclosure control
for statistical databases (respondent privacy) and disclosure control for P2P
UPIR (user privacy interpreted as respondent privacy):
• Typically, in respondent privacy, the disclosure control is applied to a
given database. The P2P UPIR protocol is however executed in real-
time as the users post queries to the server, that is, as the information
is introduced into the database. We may say that the P2P UPIR is a
streaming disclosure control method;
• For respondent privacy, it is typically important to balance low disclosure
risk with low information loss, since it is useless to publish a database
without information. In the P2P UPIR protocol, the users anonymize the
data they give to the server themselves, instead of leaving this task to the
server. For the aim of P2P UPIR, there is no need to control the utility of
the query profiles collected by the server. We will assume that the users
have no interest in providing a useful statistical database.
Some users find useful some of the services provided by the server that are
based on their query (or mail) profile. Also, typically, the server provides query
searches for free, in exchange for the valuable information that is collected in
the query profiles. We propose that the query profile should be maintained by
the user himself, and provided to the server when so desired. This approach
would put the privacy of the user in the hand of the user, where it should be.
Consider a community of v users P implementing an instance of the P2P
UPIR 1 protocol. Without loss of generality, we can limit the analysis to some
time interval t. Then we note by RPt(P ) and APt(P ) the profiles RP (P ) and
AP (P ) restricted to t. In this context, the P2P UPIR protocol is a transforma-
tion of the database which we will denote by
ρ : D → D
RPt(P ) 7→ APt(P ),
10
where D is the space of all possible query databases.
The database RPt(P ) is a table where the identifier is the user ID, and there
is an attribute Q(ti) for every approximate time interval ti, containing a single
query posted to the server by the user approximately at time ti, or a null entry.
After applying ρ to this table we obtain the transformed database APt(P ).
The action of ρ can be described as swapping the data in the column Q(ti),
under the constraint that the content in the record p can be replaced by the
content in the record q only if p ∈ N(q). Disclosure control methods of this
type are called data swapping (first appearance in [5]).
Observe that ρ also adds some noise to the time stamps of the queries. For
example, the fact that p posts first Q1 and then Q2 to the community of users,
does not imply that Q1 is posted before Q2 to the server. Therefore, in order
for the swapping to preserve columns, we should think of the queries in APt(P )
as sorted according to the time they are posted to the community of users, not
according to the time they are posted to the server.
5 Attacking P2P UPIR
In this section we will discuss attacks on P2P UPIR and some countermeasures.
The purpose with the P2P UPIR protocol is to protect the privacy of the
user when retrieving information from a server. Therefore our main concerns
are attacks from the server, or adversaries that have characteristics similar to
the server. We will also briefly consider attacks from other users.
5.1 Neighborhood attacks on P2P UPIR 1
In the P2P UPIR 1 protocol the user forwards to the server only queries from
collinear users different from himself.
Consider a community of users implementing the P2P UPIR 1 protocol and
suppose that the initialization protocol is given a combinatorial configuration
such that there are points with unique neighborhoods. That is, there are points
p ∈ P such that N(q) 6= N(p) for every q ∈ P , q 6= p. The users are mapped to
the points in the combinatorial configuration, and a user p will share communi-
cation spaces with the set of users N(p), so that the users who post the queries
in RP (p) are the users in N(p). Now suppose that the user p repeats the same
query over and over again. After a while, the probability that all users in N(p)
have posted the query will be high. Therefore, since we know that p is the only
user with the neighborhood N(p), if the query is rare, then we will be able to
link the query to the user p, and so the anonymity provided by the protocol is
broken.
The article [17] discussed the fact that it is very common that users of web-
based search engines post the same or a slightly modified version of the same
query several times. Other references on this subject are [16, 22].
Examples of combinatorial configurations with unique neighborhoods are
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provided in Section 7 and combinatorial configurations with n-anonymous neigh-
borhoods are discussed in Section 8.
5.2 Adjusting query self-submission for P2P UPIR 2
We just saw that the P2P UPIR 1 protocol, which is similar to the version of the
P2P UPIR protocol that appears in [7, 8], can be attacked if the configuration
that is used has points with unique neighborhoods. Examples of combinatorial
configurations with unique neighborhoods are the linear spaces (see Section 7).
This is a problem, since otherwise the linear spaces are optimal configura-
tions for P2P UPIR, if we consider the anonymity of the user in front of the
server. The use of a linear space maximizes the number of apparent profiles into
which the real profile of a user is diffused, under the restriction that we keep
the cardinality of the user community fixed. In particular, a linear space is the
only type of combinatorial configuration in which, for all points p, the point set
satisfies P = N(p) ∪ {p} = CN(p).
We want to modify the protocol so that the use of linear spaces resists the
attack described in the previous section. A first approach is to let the user
p forward also his own queries. In this way he will forward the queries from
CN(p). However, this implies that the users will forward to the server more of
their own queries than queries of other users. Indeed, if the user p for every line
l selects a point p′ on l with equal probability, then p will select p′ 6= p with
probability 1
rk
, and himself with probability 1
k
> 1
rk
. The server can therefore
infer the real profile of a user from his apparent profile. There will be partial
protection of the privacy of the user in front of the server. But if we let the
protocol run for a while in order to let the user post enough queries, then a
user’s real profile will be inferable from his apparent profile.
A compromise between these two extremes is to let the user adjust the
proportion of self-submission of queries so that his real profile results uniformly
distributed over the apparent profiles of the users in CN(p). This is the strategy
employed by the P2P UPIR 2 protocol, as will be illustrated below.
Definition 4. Let p0 be a user in a P2P UPIR community. We say that p0’s
real query profile is uniformly and independently distributed over the apparent
query profiles of a set of users A, if, for all queries Q ∈ RP (p0) and for all
users p ∈ A, the events “p forwards Q to the server”, have equal probability and
are mutually independent.
A user p0 in a community of users who are executing the P2P UPIR 1
protocol from the P2P UPIR INIT protocol, selects the proxy for every query
uniformly at random from N(p0), and the choices are independent. It is there-
fore clear that the RP (p0) is uniformly and independently distributed over the
apparent query profiles of N(p0). We will now see that we can adjust the self-
submission in P2P UPIR 2 and achieve a uniform and independent distribution
of RP (p0) over the apparent query profiles of CN(p0).
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Proposition 5. Let p0 be a user in a P2P UPIR 2 community. Then p0’s
real query profile is uniformly and independently distributed over the apparent
query profiles of CN(p0), if and only if p0’s probability of query self-submission
is 1|CN(p0| =
1
r(k−1)+1 .
Proof. The set of users who forwards RP (p0) to the server is CN(p0). It is
clear that RP (p0) is uniformly distributed over CN(p0) if the probability for
any user in CN(p0) to forward any of p0’s queries is 1/|CN(p0)|. In particular
this implies that for RP (p0) to be uniformly distributed over CN(p0), p0 should
have self-submission probability 1/|CN(p0)|. We have |CN(p)| = r(k − 1) + 1
for all p.
We will now see that, for RP (p0) to be uniformly distributed over CN(p0),
it is sufficient that p0 has self-submission probability 1/(r(k − 1) + 1).
Suppose p0 has self-submission probability 1/(r(k−1)+1). Let Q be a query
in RP (p0). The probability that Q is posted to the community is 1−
1
r(k−1)+1 .
The queries in RP (p0) are distributed by p0 over his communication spaces
following a uniform distribution, so the probability that Q is posted to the
communication space l is 1
r
(
1− 1
r(k−1)+1
)
= k−1
r(k−1)+1 . There are k − 1 other
users than p0 connected to l, and they are selected using a uniform distribution,
so the probability that any particular user p ∈ N(p) will read and forward Q
is 1
k−1
k−1
r(k−1)+1 =
1
r(k−1)+1 =
1
|CN(p0)|
, which equals the probability that p0
forwards Q.
The choices of communication space and user are independent, so we con-
clude that for every query Q that p0 posts to the community of users, the events
“p forwards Q to the server” have equal probability for all p ∈ CN(p) and that
the choices of p are all mutually independent.
From now on, we will always assume that the P2P UPIR 2 protocol is im-
plemented with self-submission 1/|CN(p)|, as indicated by Proposition 5.
5.3 Closed neighborhood attacks on P2P UPIR 2
The P2P UPIR 2 protocol with self-submission 1/|CN(p)| avoids the attack
described in Section 5.1, when the configuration that is used is a linear space.
However, in general, for other combinatorial configurations, the P2P UPIR 2
protocol also presents weaknesses in case of repeated queries. The real query
profile of p is independently and uniformly distributed over the apparent profiles
of CN(p). If p repeats a rare query enough, then this query can be linked to
him whenever the set CN(p) can.
Examples of combinatorial configurations with unique closed neighborhoods
are provided in Section 7 and we discuss combinatorial configurations with n-
anonymous closed neighborhoods in Section 9.
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5.4 Other attacks
Swanson and Stinson described an attack on the P2P UPIR 2 protocol that
was based on the intersection of closed neighborhoods [20]. Following [17],
they also use a repeated rare query or variation of query, say Q. Instead of
focusing on the closed neighborhood of the real owner of Q, their concern is
the closed neighborhood of the proxy. The attack consists in intersecting the
closed neighborhoods of the users who act as proxy for the query Q. The result
of the attack is set of users containing the anonymity set of the origin of the
query. If this set is small, we have reidentification. It is clear that there is an
analogous attack on the P2P UPIR 1 protocol, intersecting the neighborhoods
of the proxies.
These attacks are performed by a curious server, just as the attacks in Sec-
tion 5.1 and 5.3. It is easy to see that an intersection attack can take place if and
only if the configuration that is used in the protocol has unique neighborhoods
or closed neighborhoods, respectively. Therefore, the two types of attacks are
essentially the same.
As observed by Swanson and Stinson, we can also consider intersection at-
tacks in which the adversary is a user in the community. In this case m proxies
collude in order to find the origin of a sequence of l linked queries. Swanson and
Stinson use other incidence structures than configurations, where two points
may appear together in more than one block. In this case, the proxies can
intersect the blocks over which they received Q. If we use combinatorial config-
urations, this does not occur, so this is a strong reason for using combinatorial
configurations in P2P UPIR.
Below we briefly list other possible attacks:
• The adversary can reveal the underlying combinatorial structure, by in-
troducing users owned by him in the community. This attack was briefly
discussed in [19];
• The adversary can determine who is in the community, since these users
will have very similar apparent query profiles, and this profile will differ
from apparent query profiles of users outside the community.
5.5 Discussion
We want to point out that although P2P UPIR 2 allows for the use of linear
spaces without risk for intersection attacks, and the linear spaces have neighbor-
hoods of maximal cardinality, the original P2P UPIR 1 protocol is still slightly
simpler in implementation. This would be even more so, if the self-submission
was expressed as a proportion of the query profile. Because of its simplicity, the
use of the P2P UPIR 1 protocol is still justified, if anonymity can be ensured.
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6 On the privacy provided by P2P UPIR
In this section we specify the type of privacy that can be attained using P2P
UPIR. We also show which combinatorial configurations to use in order to attain
this privacy.
6.1 n-Confusion for P2P UPIR
We will use the notations on database disclosure control, introduced in Section 4.
As commented there, there is no interest in preserving the utility of the database
in the transformation. We are only interested in minimizing the disclosure risk.
The best result would therefore be a protected database completely free from
information. The P2P UPIR protocol can not achieve this, as single queries
contain information and are indivisible.
The purpose of P2P UPIR is to cause confusion on who is the real sender of
the query. It is useful to have a measure of the provided confusion.
Definition 6. If the cardinality of the anonymity set for the owner of any
sequence of linked queries (or query) is at least n, then we say that we have
n-confusion. In this case we say that we have n-confusing P2P UPIR.
If it is known who is in the community of users P , then the confusion on who
is the sender of a query (i.e. the cardinality of the anonymity set), cannot be
larger than the set of users. In Section 5.4 we saw that the server can see who
is in the community, since these users will have similar apparent query profiles.
Therefore, the best we can aspire for is a confusion of magnitude n = |P | on who
is the owner of a query. In general, we want to cause confusion on who is the
owner of a sequence of queries, also when the sequence is linkable by content.
Also in this case, the obvious upper bound for the confusion is n ≤ |P |.
We are interested in achieving n-confusion also for n < |P |, if this can be
justified by other advantages, for example, as in this article, if it permits us to
use the simpler P2P UPIR 1 protocol, instead of the slightly more complicated
P2P UPIR 2 protocol.
In the following example we see that n-confusion with n > 1 can fail to
be achieved by P2P UPIR, if the sequence of linked queries contains a quasi-
identifier. Therefore, in this case, the owner of the query sequence will not be
anonymous.
Example 7. Consider a sequence s of queries posted by a user p that is linkable
by content. Observe that this does not imply that s is linkable to p. Suppose that
the content of the queries in s gives information for linking s to p. Then the
anonymity set of s has cardinality one, so P2P UPIR cannot provide anonymity
for p with respect to s.
In the following we will always assume that APt(P ) does not contain se-
quences of linkable queries with quasi-identifiers.
Under this assumption, the privacy provided by P2P UPIR in case of se-
quences of linked queries is anonymity; we can link the queries but we cannot
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link them to their owner. The presence of sequences of queries that are linkable
because of their content, obstructs unlinkability in P2P UPIR. However, if we
assume that the adversary cannot use the query content for the analysis, then
unlinkability can be provided for the queries. This situation may occur, for
example, if the range of possible queries is small. More precisely, it occurs if
there are no rare repeated queries.
Either we have anonymity or we do not. Anonymity is therefore provided
by P2P UPIR if the protocol satisfies n-confusion with n > 1. The anonymity
of a user can be broken by a collusion of the n− 1 other users in his anonymity
set. Therefore it is interesting to maximize n.
In the previous discussion we have always assumed that the information
that is available to the adversary is the same information that is available to
the server. We have anonymity also with respect to other users if the identity
of the owner of a query, or a sequence query, is known only to this user. This
occurs if traffic analysis is prohibited, there are no linked sequence of queries
with quasi-identifier, and the number of users k on every communication space
is large. If k = 2 then one of the two users know with certainty who is the
owner of the query. In general, a collusion of k − 1 users is needed to deduce
the identity of the query owner. Therefore it is interesting to maximize k.
On the other hand, if we assume that the adversary user can see the identity
of the query owner, using for example traffic analysis, or if there are linked
sequences with quasi-identifier, then it is interesting to break up the real query
profiles in small parts, in order to provide some confidentiality. In this case it
is therefore interesting to maximize r, the number of communication spaces per
user.
6.2 n-Anonymity for P2P UPIR
It is clear that the use of P2P UPIR does not imply that the resulting database
APt(P ) is n-anonymous in the sense of Definition 2. Indeed, APt(P ) will not in
general have n occurrences in n different records of any sensitive sequence s.
The attacks in Sections 5.1 and 5.3 suggest that there is a quasi-identifier
present in APt(P ). For P2P UPIR 1 and P2P UPIR 2 this quasi-identifier is
the set of neighborhoods and the set of closed neighborhoods, respectively.
Formally, before transforming the database RPt(P ) using the P2P UPIR
protocol transformation ρ, we first add the attribute N(p) (or CN(p)) of p ∈ P
to RPt(P ). The attribute N(P ) (resp. CN(P )) is invariant for the action of ρ,
which in particular means that ρ preserves its quasi-identifying property. Ac-
cording to Definition 2, in order to make APt(P ) n-anonymous with respect to
this quasi-identifier, we have to ensure that every element of the set of neigh-
borhoods (resp. the set of closed neighborhoods) occurs at least n times in
APt(P ).
Definition 8. We say that a combinatorial configuration has n-anonymous
neighborhoods (resp. n-anonymous closed neighborhoods), if every neighbor-
hood (resp. closed neighborhood) of a point, is the neighborhood (resp. closed
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neighborhood) of at least n points.
6.3 Achieving n-confusion using n-anonymous neighbor-
hoods and n-anonymous closed neighborhoods
In this section we show that the P2P UPIR protocol can offer n-confusion, if
we use the correct type of combinatorial configuration.
Proposition 9. Under the assumption that queries can be linked by content,
but there are no sequences of linked queries containing quasi-identifiers, the P2P
UPIR 1 protocol (resp. the P2P UPIR 2 protocol) provides n-confusion if it is
implemented with a combinatorial configuration with n-anonymous neighbor-
hoods (resp. n-anonymous closed neighborhoods).
However, if the sequence of queries cannot be linked by content, then we have
n-confusion with n equal to the cardinality of the neighborhoods and the closed
neighborhoods, respectively.
Proof. We will prove the result for P2P UPIR 1. The proof for P2P UPIR 2 is
analogous.
Following the notation in Section 4.2, we apply the P2P UPIR 1 protocol
ρ to the database RPt(P ) and obtain APt(P ). Suppose that the adversary is
allowed to analyze the content of the queries and is able to correctly link a
sequence s of queries to each other, as having the same origin, say, the user p0.
We have assumed that s does not contain a quasi-identifier, which could identify
p0 as the origin of s, by content alone.
Because of the properties of ρ, all queries in s will be in the records of
APt(P ) that correspond to N(p0). The anonymity set of s is the intersection
of the neighborhoods of the neighbors of user p0, that is,
⋂
p∈N(p0)
N(p). If the
combinatorial configuration has n-anonymous neighborhoods, then this inter-
section has cardinality at least n, so we have n-confusion.
If query sequences cannot be linked by content, then the anonymity set for
the owner of a single query is the neighborhood of the proxy of the query. This
anonymity set has cardinality r(k− 1), so in this case we have n-confusion with
n = r(k − 1).
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7 Combinatorial configurations with unique neigh-
borhoods or unique closed neighborhoods
In this section we give examples of combinatorial configurations that have unique
neighborhoods or unique closed neighborhoods for all points. We saw in Sec-
tion 5 that such configurations should be avoided for the use in P2P UPIR 1
and P2P UPIR 2 respectively.
We provide examples of combinatorial configurations with
• anonymous neighborhoods but unique closed neighborhoods (as the com-
binatorial configurations with deficiency one),
• unique neighborhoods but anonymous closed neighborhoods (as the linear
spaces), and
• unique neighborhoods and unique closed neighborhoods (as the pentagonal
geometries without opposite line pairs).
7.1 Examples of combinatorial configurations with unique
neighborhoods
In this section we give examples of combinatorial configurations with unique
neighborhoods.
Proposition 10. The linear spaces have unique neighborhoods.
Proof. In a regular linear space every pair of points is collinear. Therefore, for
any point p, the neighborhood N(p) is all the point set except for p, so that p
is the only point with neighborhood N(p).
A triangle in a combinatorial configuration is a set of three distinct points
such that they are pairwise collinear on three distinct lines. A combinatorial
configuration is triangle-free if it has no triangles.
Proposition 11. A triangle-free combinatorial configuration, not a graph, has
unique neighborhoods.
Proof. Let C = (P,L, I) be a triangle-free (r, k)-configuration with k > 2 (so
that it is not a graph). Fix a point p0 ∈ P and let p1, p2 ∈ N(p0) be two points
collinear with p0. Let p3 ∈ P be a point such that N(p0) = N(p3). Then p3
is collinear with p1 and p2, but not with p0, so that there is no line through
all the four points p0, p1, p2 and p3. Therefore, p1 and p2 can not be collinear,
because if they were, then at least one of the triples p0, p1, p2 or p1, p2, p3 would
form a triangle. In other words, no pair of points in N(p0) = N(p3) is collinear.
Therefore the number of points on every line in C is k = 2, because if k > 2,
then there would be at least one pair of collinear points p, q ∈ N(p0) = N(p3).
We deduce that, whenever k > 2, given a point p0 ∈ P there is no point p3 ∈ P
distinct from p0 such that N(p0) = N(p3).
18
A pentagonal geometry is a combinatorial configuration in which, for any
point p, all points not in the closed neighborhood of p, are on the same line [2].
This line is called the opposite line popp of p.
Proposition 12. A pentagonal geometry has unique neighborhoods.
Proof. Let p 6= q be two points in the pentagonal geometry. Suppose that q is
not on popp. Then p and q are collinear, so q ∈ N(p). But q 6∈ N(q), and we
deduce that N(p) 6= N(q). Now suppose that q is on popp. We have that p is
not on popp, so popp 6= qopp. Let x 6= q be a point on popp. Then x ∈ N(q), but
x 6∈ N(p), so N(p) 6= N(q).
7.2 Combinatorial configurations with unique closed neigh-
borhoods
In this section we give examples of combinatorial configurations with unique
closed neighborhoods.
The parameters of any combinatorial (v, b, r, k)-configuration satisfies the
inequality v ≥ r(k − 1) + 1. We have the equality v = r(k − 1) + 1 if and
only if we have a linear space. The deficiency of a combinatorial (v, b, r, k)-
configuration is the number v − (r(k − 1) + 1).
Proposition 13. A combinatorial configuration with deficiency one has unique
closed neighborhoods.
Proof. In a combinatorial configuration with deficiency one, for any point p
there is only one point in the complement of CN(p), the anti-podal point of
p. The anti-podal points come in pairs, so every point has a unique anti-podal
point and therefore, a unique closed neighborhood.
From the proof of Proposition 13 we also deduce that combinatorial config-
urations with deficiency one have 2-anonymous neighborhoods; any point and
its anti-podal point share neighborhood.
It can be proved that if two points p and q in a pentagonal geometry share
the same opposite line l, then all points in l will have the same opposite line:
the line spanned by p and q. Such a pair of lines is called an opposite line pair.
Proposition 14. A pentagonal geometry with no pair of opposite lines has
unique closed neighborhood.
Proof. For any point p in the pentagonal geometry, the set of points on popp is
the complement of CN(p). If the pentagonal geometry has no opposite line pair,
then all points have unique opposite lines, hence unique closed neighborhoods.
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8 Combinatorial configurations with n-anonymous
neighborhoods
In Section 6.3 we saw that combinatorial configurations with n-anonymous
neighborhoods are interesting for use with P2P UPIR 1.
8.1 Examples of combinatorial configurations with
n-anonymous neighborhoods
Here we give an important example of a family of combinatorial configurations
with n-anonymous neighborhoods.
Proposition 15. A transversal design TD(k, n) has n-anonymous neighbor-
hoods.
Proof. The point set of the transversal design can be partitioned into k groups
of cardinality n, such that the points in the same group are not collinear. Any
pair of points from different groups is contained in exactly one line. This implies
that the n points in the same group all have the same neighborhood.
The transversal design TD(k, n) in this construction is a combinatorial
(nk, n2, n, k)-configuration. Hence the construction provides a combinatorial
configuration with n-anonymous neighborhoods that is suitable for nk P2P
UPIR users and requires the use of n2 communication spaces.
As we saw in 2.2.2, transversal designs can be constructed using latin squares
and many transversal designs can be easily constructed using affine planes. A
transversal design constructed from an affine plane of order q has parameters
(q2, q2, q, q). The use of the affine plane of order 2 gives an ordinary square with
4 points and 4 lines with 2 points on every line. The use of the affine plane of
order 3 gives the Pappus configuration.
8.2 A characterization of the combinatorial configurations
with n-anonymous neighborhoods
We will now characterize the combinatorial configurations with n-anonymous
neighborhoods exactly.
Proposition 16. A combinatorial (v, b, r, k)-configuration with n-anonymous
neighborhoods is a combinatorial configuration that satisfies the following con-
ditions:
• There exists a partition G = {gi}
m
i=1 of the point set such that the points
in the same part are not collinear, and |gi| ≥ n for all i ∈ [1, . . . ,m];
• We have that r ≥ n and m ≥ k.
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Proof. Let C = (P,L, I) be a combinatorial configuration with n-anonymous
neighborhoods. Then every point p ∈ P shares its neighborhood N(p) with
n− 1 other points. “Having the same neighborhood” is a binary relation which
is obviously
• reflexive (p has the same neighborhood as p);
• symmetric (if N(p) = N(q) then N(q) = N(p));
• transitive (if N(p1) = N(p2) and N(p2) = N(p3), then
N(p1) = N(p3)).
So it is an equivalence relation and defines a partition G = {g1, . . . , gm} of the
point set, in which |gi| ≥ n for all gi ∈ G. We will call the parts gi ∈ G
groups. The neighborhood N(p) of the point p is defined as the set of points
that are collinear with p, and different from p. In particular, if two points p
and q satisfy N(p) = N(q), then they are not collinear, since if they were, then
p ∈ N(q) which would imply p ∈ N(p). Therefore points in the same group are
not collinear.
For the bound on r, consider a pair of collinear points p and q. Let g be the
group containing p. All points in g have the same neighborhood, so q ∈ N(p′)
for every p′ ∈ g. No line contains two points in g, and we deduce that there are
at least |g| ≥ n lines through q, so that r ≥ n.
Regarding the number of points on every line k, we see that, since points
in the same group are not collinear, it is clear that any line contains k distinct
points from k distinct parts of G, so that k ≤ m.
There are indeed, n-anonymous combinatorial configurations which are not
transversal designs.
Example 17. Consider the combinatorial (36, 72, 6, 3)-configuration with point
set P = {1, . . . , 36} and line set as in Table 1.
It is clear that this combinatorial (36, 72, 6, 3)-configuration is 3-anonymous,
but k = 3 < 12 = m and r = 6 > 3 = n. We also observe that rk = 18 divides
v = 36 and b = 72. The groups in the partition are given by Table 2.
8.3 Optimal configurations for n-anonymous P2P UPIR 1
The privacy provided to the users of n-anonymous P2P UPIR 1 is n-confusion,
where n is the cardinality of the anonymity sets. The points in the same ano-
nymity set have the same neighborhood. As we saw in Proposition 9, if query
sequences cannot be linked by content, then we have r(k − 1)-confusion, since
this is the cardinality of the neighborhood of the proxy of a single query. It is
therefore interesting to maximize both n and r(k − 1), although which one is
the most important may depend on the context.
In a combinatorial configuration with n-anonymous neighborhoods, the ano-
nymity set and the neighborhood of a point are disjoint. Therefore, maximizing
n and r(k − 1) simultaneously is the same as requiring v = n + r(k − 1), so
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Table 1: Line set of a the combinatorial (36, 72, 6, 3) configuration in Exam-
ple 17.
{{1, 4, 7},
{1, 5, 8},
{1, 6, 9},
{2, 4, 8},
{2, 5, 9},
{2, 6, 7},
{3, 4, 9},
{3, 5, 7},
{3, 6, 8},
{1, 10, 13},
{1, 11, 14},
{1, 12, 15},
{2, 10, 14},
{2, 11, 15},
{2, 12, 13},
{3, 10, 15},
{3, 11, 13},
{3, 12, 14},
{4, 16, 19},
{4, 17, 20},
{4, 18, 21},
{5, 16, 20},
{5, 17, 21},
{5, 18, 19},
{6, 16, 21},
{6, 17, 19},
{6, 18, 20},
{7, 22, 25},
{7, 23, 26},
{7, 24, 27},
{8, 22, 26},
{8, 23, 27},
{8, 24, 25},
{9, 22, 27},
{9, 23, 25},
{9, 24, 26},
{10, 28, 31},
{10, 29, 32},
{10, 30, 33},
{11, 28, 32},
{11, 29, 33},
{11, 30, 31},
{12, 28, 33},
{12, 29, 31},
{12, 30, 32},
{13, 16, 34},
{13, 17, 35},
{13, 18, 36},
{14, 16, 35},
{14, 17, 36},
{14, 18, 34},
{15, 16, 36},
{15, 17, 34},
{15, 18, 35},
{19, 22, 31},
{19, 23, 32},
{19, 24, 33},
{20, 22, 32},
{20, 23, 33},
{20, 24, 31},
{21, 22, 33},
{21, 23, 31},
{21, 24, 32},
{25, 28, 34},
{25, 29, 35},
{25, 30, 36},
{26, 28, 35},
{26, 29, 36},
{26, 30, 34},
{27, 28, 36},
{27, 29, 34},
{27, 30, 35}}
Table 2: The partition of the point set into anonymity sets of the
combinatorial(36, 72, 6, 3)-configuration with 3-anonymous neighborhoods in
Example 17.
{{1, 2, 3}, {4, 5, 6}, {7, 8, 9}, {10, 11, 12},
{13, 14, 15}, {16, 17, 18}, {19, 20, 21}, {22, 23, 24},
{25, 26, 27}, {28, 29, 30}, {31, 32, 33}, {34, 35, 36}}
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that the anonymity set and the neighborhood together form the entire point
set of the configuration. It is easy to see that a transversal design satisfies this
condition, since a point p in a transversal design is neighbor with all points that
are not in the anonymity set of p.
Indeed, if we in Lemma 16 add a restriction on regularity of the group
cardinalities, and maximize n, what we get are exactly the transversal designs.
Theorem 18. In a combinatorial (v, b, r, k)-configuration C with n-anonymous
neighborhoods and anonymity partition G = {gi}mi=1 and |gi| = n for all i ∈
[1, . . . ,m], we have that
r = n if and only if m = k.
In this case C is a transversal design TD(k, n) and v = kn, b = n2.
Proof. Since the configuration is connected, if r = n, then necessarily k = m.
On the other hand, if k = m, then necessarily r = n, since if we fix one part
g ∈ G and a point p ∈ g, then a line through g has k points through k = m
distinct parts g ∈ G, so the line have one point in every part in G. For any part
g′ ∈ G different from g there is also a total of n lines through p. Since these
lines have one point in every part of G, we get r = n.
A transversal design is a uniform group divisible design in which the number
of groups |G| equals the length of the blocks k. We have seen that an n-
anonymous combinatorial (v, b, n,m)-configuration such that |gi| = n andm = k
satisfy exactly these conditions, so it is a transversal design TD(k, n).
9 Combinatorial configurations with n-anonymous
closed neighborhoods
In Section 6.3 we saw that combinatorial configurations with n-anonymous
closed neighborhoods are interesting for P2P UPIR 2. By now, the reader is al-
ready familiar with the most important example of combinatorial configurations
with n-anonymous closed neighborhoods.
Proposition 19. A linear space on n points has n-anonymous closed neighbor-
hoods.
Proof. In a linear space all points are collinear.
9.1 Combinatorial configurations with n-anonymous closed
neighborhoods from combinatorial configurations with
n-anonymous neighborhoods
After all, there is not much difference between the definition of n-anonymous
neighborhoods and the definition of n-anonymous closed neighborhoods. The
next Theorem 20 shows that we can use combinatorial configurations with the
former property to construct combinatorial configurations with the latter prop-
erty.
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Theorem 20. Let C be a combinatorial (v, b, r, k)-configuration with n-anonymous
neighborhoods such that k|n. Then there also exists a combinatorial (v, b+n, r+
1, k)-configuration C′ with n-anonymous closed neighborhoods.
Proof. Let C be as stated above. Then every point shares neighborhood with
exactly n more points. Theorem 16 implies that in C there is a partition G
of the point set so that points in the same partition are the points with the
same neighborhood. This implies that points in the same partition are not
collinear. Define C′ by adding k n
k
= n new lines, so that every new line contains
only points from the same part of G. Let A be a set of points with the same
neighborhood in C. For any p ∈ A there are k − 1 other points p1, . . . , pk−1
in A collinear with p by one of the new lines, such that CN(p) = CN(pi) for
i = 1, . . . , k − 1. This concludes the proof.
As a corollary of Theorem 20 we get that an affine plane of order k is a com-
binatorial configuration with k-anonymous closed neighborhoods. Just apply
the construction in the proof of Theorem 20 to a transversal design TD(k, k).
But an affine plane of order k is a linear space on v = k2 points, so we
already know from Proposition 19 that it is a k2-anonymous combinatorial con-
figuration for P2P UPIR 2. Indeed, n-anonymity implies m-anonymity for all
m ≤ n. Observe though that in general the combinatorial (r, k)-configuration
constructed in Theorem 20 is k-anonymous but not m-anonymous for m > k.
Not all combinatorial configurations with n-anonymous closed neighbor-
hoods can be obtained using the construction in Theorem 20. For example,
we can not use this method to construct a finite projective plane.
9.2 Optimal configurations for P2P UPIR 2
The P2P UPIR 2 was designed to provide n-confusion with linear spaces. We
have the following result.
Theorem 21. A regular linear space on v points provides n-confusing P2P
UPIR 2 with n = v. This is optimal.
Proof. It is immediate that a linear space provides n-confusing P2P UPIR 2
with n = v. Since the confusion can not be larger than the total number of
points v in the configuration, this is optimal.
A linear space is a (v, k, 1)-BIBD. More generally, in a (v, k, λ)-BIBD any
two points are connected by λ ≥ 1 lines, so also in this case we have opti-
mal n-confusing P2P UPIR 2. However, then the BIBD is not a combinatorial
configuration. In this article we have provided reasons that justify the use of
combinatorial configurations for P2P UPIR. As was observed in [20], other inci-
dence structures are also interesting, in particular if it is assumed that colluding
users can communicate over channels that are exterior to the protocol.
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10 Conclusions
We have presented two different P2P UPIR protocols, P2P UPIR 1 in which
the users do not self-submit and P2P UPIR 2 in which they do. Then we de-
scribed an attack on P2P UPIR 1, based on unique neighborhoods, and adjusted
the self-submission for P2P UPIR 2 in order to avoid neighborhood attacks on
linear spaces. We also showed that P2P UPIR 2 is still vulnerable to closed
neighborhood attacks, if the closed neighborhoods in the combinatorial config-
urations are unique. We gave examples of combinatorial configurations with
unique neighborhoods and unique closed neighborhoods.
Then we presented the combinatorial configurations with k-anonymous neigh-
borhoods and k-anonymous closed neighborhoods, respectively. We character-
ized, as n-confusion, the privacy provided by a P2P UPIR protocol that uses
one of the combinatorial configurations from these families. Finally we stud-
ied the combinatorial configurations with k-anonymous neighborhoods and k-
anonymous closed neighborhoods. We distinguished the transversal designs and
the linear spaces as optimal configurations for P2P UPIR from these two fami-
lies, respectively.
We want to point out that there are two trivial ways to connect commu-
nication spaces and users; the all-to-all and the one-to-all distributions. As
combinatorial structures both can be interpreted as degenerated linear spaces,
since every pair of points (users) share exactly one line (communication space).
Used in the P2P UPIR 2 protocol, they provide the same anonymity in front
of the server as does a linear space with the same number of points. However,
with respect to other users, there is no anonymity in the all-to-all distribution
and confidentiality is lost in the all-to-one distribution. Consequently, the rea-
son why non-degenerated combinatorial configurations are interesting for P2P
UPIR 2, is because they offer some anonymity and confidentiality with respect
to the other users in the community.
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